










The aim of this paper is to apply Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatic 
method to establishing if proponents of transcendental arguments 
could hold the conclusions of their arguments to be fallibly known. I 
will thus propose a pragmatic clarification of the concepts of a 
priority, necessity, and infallibility in order to ascertain if these 
concepts are unavoidably related or not. I will argue that an a priori 
knowable necessary proposition is not in principle indubitable, 
whereas a proposition infallibly known is so. Finally, I will apply 





I wish to establish whether proponents of transcendental arguments could 
coherently hold the conclusions of their arguments to be fallibly known. 
Transcendental arguments are characterized by proposing an a priori line of 
reasoning and by claiming a necessary status for their conclusions. In so doing, 
they commonly aim to establish that some aspects of our thinking are conditions 
of possibility of knowledge and experience.1 Do these characteristics also entail 
the claim of infallibility for transcendental arguments? This is precisely the 
question that the paper intends to answer. 
It is evident that, in order to answer the latter question, the concepts of a 
priority, necessity, and infallibility need to be clarified. Accordingly, I would 
like to face the problem by proposing what Charles S. Peirce called a pragmatic 
clarification of these concepts. By pragmatic clarification I mean an elucidation 
of the meaning of a concept that renders explicit the practical consequences that 
would follow if that concept could truly be attributed to something. If a stone 
were truly hard, then it would follow that I could break a window with it. This is 
an attempt to express more clearly what Peirce asserted in his 1878 paper “How 
to Make Our Ideas Clear.”2 I think that it is particularly helpful to consider this 
problem from a pragmatic standpoint, since the construction of a transcendental 
argument is a kind of ‘practice’ itself.3  
As I said above, my purpose is to determine whether the search for a 
priority and necessity would also entail the pursuit of infallibility for a 
proponent of transcendental arguments. Thus, by means of a pragmatic 
clarification we need to establish if the claim of infallibility entails different and 
independent practical consequences from the claims of a priority and necessity. 
That is to say, if the practical consequences expected in relation with the claim 
of a priority and necessity do verify, does this immediately imply the claim of 
infallibility? On the other hand, if the practical consequences expected in 
relation with the claim of infallibility do not take place, does this immediately 
imply the lack of a priority and necessity? A positive answer to this latter 
question is the most easy thing to expect, at least with respect to the claim of 
necessity. However, the problem is not so easy as it seems at first sight. 
I will begin to face these problems by clarifying what a transcendental 
argument is. We will see that there are at least two very different ways to 
account for what a transcendental argument is. We will thus need to consider 
both these kinds of transcendental arguments with respect to our pragmatic 
clarifications. After this elucidation on the scope and methods of transcendental 
arguments, I will seek some insights on the concepts of a priority, necessity and 
infallibility in the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Charles S. Peirce, that is: 
the philosophers who became famous for transcendental philosophy and 
pragmatic clarifications respectively. We will see that their writings will be 
insufficient for our purposes. Then, I will introduce my own attempt at a 
pragmatic clarification on the concepts at issue. We will see how only one kind 
of transcendental argument here identified will be able to coherently endorse a 
fallibilistic standpoint in its quest for a priority and necessity. 
 
2. What is a Transcendental Argument? 
 
Transcendental arguments are often understood as means of providing a 
refutation of sceptical challenges. It was Peter Strawson who inaugurated this 
way of considering the aim and methods of transcendental arguments. His 1959 
book Individuals and his 1966 interpretation of Kant’s first Critique The Bounds 
of Sense inaugurated a new era for transcendental philosophy.4 These books 
were so influential that they still lie at the basis of today’s widespread 
understanding of transcendental philosophy, especially in the English speaking 
world. This is not to say that it is easy to find a common description of anti-
sceptical transcendental arguments. For example, they might aim to face very 
different sceptical challenges: in fact there exist various ways to advance 
scepticism on the existence of external objects, on causation, etc. Moreover, 
various kinds of ‘modest’ transcendental arguments are being proposed today,5 
the latter being alternative solutions with respect to those projects claiming to 
establish the actual existence of real external objects. 
This multiplicity of ways of understanding anti-sceptical transcendental 
arguments notwithstanding, I think a minimal common description of their 
characteristics can be proposed. First of all, they all begin by establishing a 
proposition that not even the sceptic could coherently deny, as long as he/she is 
posing a doubt. Then, they offer a proof that the same proposition doubted by 
the sceptic is implied in the proposition that not even the sceptic could deny. If 
this were so, the sceptic cannot coherently doubt the proposition in question, 
otherwise he/she would contradict the same proposition he/she could not deny. 
Thus, anti-sceptical transcendental arguments establish the necessity of their 
conclusions by showing that we cannot coherently believe some propositions to 
be mistaken.6 The latter claim in particular will be relevant for our purpose in 
this study. We might schematize the steps of a transcendental argument of this 
kind as follows: 
 
The sceptic doubts P, 
 
The sceptic cannot coherently doubt Q, as long as he is posing a doubt, 
 
But Q involves P, 
 
Therefore, the sceptic cannot coherently doubt P. 
 
This is a sketchy way of presenting anti-sceptical transcendental argu-
ments, but it captures some very central characteristics of their structure. Yet, 
this is not the only way to understand the aims and methods of transcendental 
philosophy. As I stressed above, Strawson introduced this way of refuting the 
sceptic by proposing an innovative reading of Kant’s first Critique. The latter 
reading is widely contrasted by Kant scholars as authoritative as Henry Allison, 
Graham Bird, and Wolfgang Carl.7 If it is true that this way of arguing cannot be 
attributed to Kant, it means that there exists at least another way to understand 
transcendental arguments, that is: the way proposed by the inventor of 
transcendental philosophy in the modern sense. 
Following the latter reading of Kant, his purpose was not essentially that 
of refuting the sceptic, a purpose he reserved for limited sections of his first 
Critique. On the contrary, he wanted to disentangle the subjective conditions of 
possibility of our knowledge: a knowledge that was not in doubt. He wished to 
recognize those conditions of possibility in order to prevent their misuse in 
speculative metaphysics.8 Thus, Kantian transcendental arguments aim to show, 
by means of a priori reasoning, not so much that, but how some features of our 
knowledge are necessary and a priory.9 Take for example causality. Kant never 
doubted that causality was an objective a priori and necessary feature of our 
knowledge. He wanted just to establish where the subjective source of that 
knowledge lay. We can summarize the procedure of Kantian transcendental 
arguments as follows: 
 
Our knowledge presents characteristics A, B, C, etc. that are necessary 
and a priori, 
 
A, B, C, etc. cannot but rest on subjective conditions X, Y, Z, etc., 
 
Therefore, X, Y, Z, etc. are subjective conditions of our knowledge. 
 
Unlike anti-sceptical transcendental arguments, Kantian transcendental 
arguments do not aim to establish the necessity of their conclusions by showing 
that some propositions cannot coherently be believed to be mistaken. On the 
contrary, they assume the necessity and a priority of some elements of our 
knowledge and then try to establish their source in the subjective conditions of 
knowledge.10 The necessity in question is assumed on the grounds of the use we 
make in mathematics, the physical sciences, everyday life, of concepts like 
space and causality. Then, this necessity is traced back to the subjective 
conditions of forming judgements on those issues. Even if these conditions are 
‘subjective’, their relation to the aforementioned concepts can be treated and 
argued for objectively, by showing how there could be no objective knowledge 
as we assume there is, if there would not be such conditions. It is so evident that 
Kantian transcendental arguments do not aim to establish their necessity on the 
grounds of an impossibility to coherently doubt something as anti-sceptical 
transcendental arguments do. They argue that it is necessary to recognize some 
subjective conditions in order to account for some a priori knowable necessary 
propositions that are essential in our knowledge. 
As far as we have distinguished two different kinds of transcendental 
arguments, we must now establish if fallibilism can be coherently held by both 
of them. Thus, in the next section we will begin with our clarifications on the 
concepts of a priority, necessity, and infallibility and then later we will use these 
clarifications in order to answer the question at issue. 
 
3. Kant and Peirce on A Priority, Necessity, and Infallibility 
 
Before we undertake our pragmatic clarification, I wish to analyze Kant’s and 
Peirce’s treatments of a priority, necessity and infallibility. As is well known, 
Kant is the inventor of transcendental philosophy in the modern sense and Peirce 
was the first who proposed the pragmatic maxim as a means to clarify concepts. 
For this reason their insights into this topic need to be considered. 
For Kant, necessity, together with universality, was a sign of the a priory 
character of a representation. He stressed that if a judgment shows necessity and 
strict universality, it cannot but derive such characteristics from its being a 
priori.11 Thus, it is evident that necessity and a priority were for Kant strictly 
related concepts. 12 A priority meant for Kant that a proposition could be known 
‘by reason alone’, and could not be derived from observation. For him, that was 
also the only possible source of necessity. 
Even if Kant did not directly address the problem of infallibility, it seems 
that he thought this characteristic to be implied by a priority. In fact, he argued 
that by establishing the a priori and necessary status of some judgements, his 
philosophy was also able to provide apodictic certainty.13 Thus, Kant thought 
that by establishing the a priori nature of a judgment one was also able to 
recognize its necessary status and warrant its infallibility. However, Kant did not 
provide any argument to sustain the latter claim. Of course, the clarification of 
the concepts of a priority, necessity and infallibility was not one of his aims. 
Thus, we should not blame him for not having offered us such a clarification. 
Moreover, it is not impossible to find in Kant’s own work the instruments to 
develop a defensible position on the relationships among a priority, necessity 
and infallibility, but this would mean going beyond Kant himself.14 
We will not be any luckier by turning to Peirce’s treatment of the 
concepts of a priority, necessity and infallibility. Peirce’s emphasis on 
fallibilism notwithstanding, he never provided a detailed analysis of how this 
concept relates to necessity and a priority. We might find some insights in his 
account of the relationship between necessity and fallibility in the a priori 
reasoning of mathematics.15 For Peirce, mathematics stands out as being a 
science totally detached from particular observation. With particular observation 
I mean inductive observation of the natural world. Peirce considered 
mathematics as being observational, but in a quite different sense. He thought 
that in mathematics it was essential to observe a diagram constructed a priori 
from a theorem. Mathematics is thus iconic and observational, but does not rely 
on a posteriori experience. As such, it is able to seek necessary relations with an 
a priori procedure. In considering the possibility of attributing necessity and 
infallibility to the propositions obtained through this a priori way of arguing, 
Peirce had a contrary aim with respect to Kant. He did want to preserve the 
possibility of treating a priori knowable mathematical propositions as necessary, 
but he also wanted to claim fallibility for every such proposition. The result is 
not a clarification on how far necessity, a priority and infallibility are 
overlapping concepts. On the contrary, Peirce only stressed that we must treat a 
priori knowable mathematical propositions as necessary as long as we have not 
any reason to doubt them, even if the proposition could be mistaken and thus 
subject to fallibilism.16 This makes sense, but is not enough for our purposes. If 
the proposition came to be doubted, would this be sufficient to claim it is not 
necessary or a priori? If, for some reasons, we fell into a genuine doubt on some 
very basic mathematical propositions, e.g. that twice two is four (following one 
of Peirce’s own example), and then re-established their truth, would this be 
enough to discard the claim of necessity for those propositions? And what about 
infallibility: could we continue to stress that our knowledge of those 
propositions is infallible? It is exactly these questions that Peirce’s formulation 
of the problem does not help to answer. 
Kant’s and Peirce’s treatment of the concepts of apriority, necessity and 
infallibility have helped us in focusing the problem at hand. However, they 
didn’t offer any hint on how to pursue a clarification on these concepts. Thus, 
we must now turn to our attempt at a pragmatic clarification. 
 
4. A Pragmatic Clarification 
 
According to our rephrasing of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, a pragmatic 
clarification needs to render explicit the practical consequences that would 
follow if the concept at issue could truly be attributed to something.17 Recalling 
one of Peirce’s own examples, if I could truly say that a stone is hard, it means 
that it would resist being scratched by many other substances.18 Thus, pragmatic 
clarifications build conditional sentences in which the antecedent indicates the 
concept at issue and the consequent the practical consequences that would 
follow if it were truly attributable to something. As far as our aim is a 
clarification of the concepts of a priority, necessity, and infallibility, we should 
obtain conditionals of this kind for each of them. 
A priority is an epistemic concept that concerns the way in which we get 
to know something. We say that we know a proposition a priori if we do not 
need observation and inductive generalization to obtain that knowledge. On the 
contrary, we can get to know that proposition just by means of reasoning. 
Mathematics is arguably the best example of a priori inquiry. Leaving apart the 
nature and justification of mathematical proofs, mathematics is able to reach 
conclusions by developing its reasoning regardless of inductive information. 
This does not entail that mathematical truths are necessary or that our 
knowledge of them is infallible. In fact, there are many examples of 
mathematical and geometric propositions that were considered necessary in the 
past and that are now refuted.19 A priority only describes the way in which 
mathematical knowledge is obtained.  
These considerations can easily be turned into a pragmatic clarification of 
the concept at hand. In order to do that, we should only ask: which practical 
consequences should we expect if the concept of a priority could truly be 
attributed to our knowledge of a proposition? According to what we have just 
said above, we should expect that that proposition could be argued for and 
sustained by reason alone. Rearticulating some of Peirce’s examples, we can get 
to know that twice two is four, or that the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180° 
in a Euclidean space, without making use of inductive sampling and 
generalization. Thus, the practical consequences that the concept of a priority 
entails concern the ways in which we should expect the proposition in question 
to be obtained and defended. If a proposition were truly a priori knowable, it 
could be obtained and defended by reason alone.20 This confirms that a priority 
does not imply necessity, insofar as, as we noticed in reference to mathematics, 
our a priori way of arguing can also be mistaken. 
One might wonder about the appropriateness of the pragmatic method to 
clarify the concept of a priority. He/she could ask if a pragmatic clarification 
could really highlight a positive content for the concept of a priority, since the 
pragmatic method is often understood as an undertaking that brings concepts 
back to their roots in our experience. This seems incompatible with our 
clarification of a priority which, as we have just said, is attributed to concepts 
that can be obtained independently from experience. To answer this objection, it 
is useful to recall that Clarence I. Lewis, one of the main figures in the 
pragmatist tradition, proposed long ago what he called the pragmatic a priori. 
He introduced this view of the a priori to criticize previous conceptions, but also 
to point out the active and essential role of mind in experience. His conception 
of apriority thus introduced a pragmatic explanation of the fixation of a priori 
concepts, one that put emphasis on the process of hypothesis and verification 
through which these concepts are established.21 His conception allowed also 
room for modifications in our a priori concepts, even though he held these 
modifications not to be arbitrarily imposed. As Lewis’ pragmatic a priori shows, 
an application of the pragmatic method to the concept of a priority is not only 
plausible, but it has also been undertaken by a classical figure in the pragmatist 
tradition. 
Let us now turn to the concept of necessity. Necessity can be attributed to 
both a priori and a posteriori knowable propositions. This is easily shown by the 
necessity we ascribe both to mathematical truths and physical constants. As we 
have just stressed, a priority and a posteriority tell us something about the way 
in which something gets to be known. Thus, if we can establish necessary 
propositions by means of both a priori and a posteriori inquiry, this means that 
necessity must concern something different than our epistemic means.  
Since it is easy to confound necessity with a priority, I will first consider 
the case in which necessity is ascribed to a posteriori knowable propositions. 
When we ascribe necessity to propositions we know a posteriori, e.g. the 
proposition asserting the value of the gravitational constant, their necessity 
seems to come from general facts about the external world. If this is true, 
necessity is not an epistemic attribute, but is something that concerns the status 
of the class of objects to which the proposition refers. This is quite easily shown 
for propositions concerning physical constants, as far as in this case necessity is 
established on the basis of experimental data on the class of objects at issue. 
However, this thesis seems also appropriate to describe the a priori inquiries of 
mathematics. In this field of study, necessity concerns characteristics ascribable 
to mathematical and geometrical objects.22 
In saying that necessity concerns the status of the class of objects to 
which the proposition in question refers, we are espousing a view on necessity 
very similar to that of Saul Kripke. In his book Naming and Necessity Kripke 
holds that necessity concerns the metaphysical status of the object a proposition 
is intended to describe and tells us that it would be as it is in all possible 
worlds.23 However, according to this formulation, physical laws are contingent, 
since they do not hold in all possible worlds. Accordingly, when dealing with a 
posteriori knowable propositions Kripke ascribes necessity only to rigid 
designators (e.g. Water is H2O, Hesperus is Phosphorus). We need now to 
introduce some distinctions for the sake of clarity. We can speak of 
metaphysical necessity only when a proposition holds in all possible worlds. 
Within metaphysically necessary propositions, we can distinguish analytic 
truths, which can be equated to logical necessities, and synthetic truths, which 
are nothing but those propositions described by Kripke’s rigid designators.24 
Strictly speaking, physical necessity is thus metaphysically contingent, insofar 
as it does not hold in all possible worlds. However, like metaphysical necessity, 
physical necessity is not an epistemic notion, but concerns the objects referred to 
in the propositions in question. Moreover, the domain in which the propositions 
are claimed to hold necessarily is delineated very clearly. This is evident if we 
use a conditional of the following kind to address the necessity of a physical 
law: Necessarily, if a possible world had the same physical characteristics as 
ours then physical law L would apply to it. This conditional limits the validity of 
physical laws to the possible worlds that have the same characteristics as ours 
and is thus capable of clearly setting the limits in which physical necessity 
applies. In so doing, it is also able to express physical necessity in a conditional 
proposition that holds in all possible worlds, thus mimicking metaphysical 
necessity. We should also keep in mind that, as far as transcendental necessity 
only applies to a world known through our human cognitive capacities, we 
should construct a similar conditional to account for it. We need now turn our 
reflections on the concept of necessity into a pragmatic conditional. 
Metaphysically necessary propositions attribute properties that would 
hold in all possible worlds. Moreover, we can express physical and 
transcendental necessities in conditional propositions holding in all possible 
worlds. If all these propositions really hold in all possible worlds, we should 
expect that we could not find any instance, both through empirical and logical 
inquiry, that falsifies those propositions. This results in the following conditional 
sentence which allow us to offer a unique pragmatic clarification for the various 
types of necessity here presented:25 if a proposition were truly necessary, we 
could not find any instance that falsifies it.26 This is equally true for propositions 
concerning a priori and empirical truths. If twice two were necessarily 4, or if 
water were necessarily H2O,27 we could not find any instances that falsify those 
sentences. The only difference consists in the methods we would use to find the 
falsifying instance: in one case logical and a priori, in the other empirical and a 
posteriori.28 
It should be kept in mind that this is very different from saying that if a 
proposition were truly necessary we could not believe it is falsified by any 
instance. Necessity concerns the objects of propositions and not our beliefs 
about those objects. Thus, the objective status of the claim of necessity is 
confirmed by the fact that a necessary proposition needs not be in principle 
indubitable. Doubt concerns our beliefs and not the objective value of a 
proposition. It is perfectly possible to believe a necessary proposition to be false 
and this would not affect its necessity at all. If, for example, some new 
experiment in physics caused us to doubt the universality we currently ascribe to 
the gravitational constant, but then that experiment were proved to be invalid, 
we would have no reason to doubt the necessary status of the proposition 
asserting the value of the gravitational constant. Similarly, a reiterated wrong 
calculation can cause us to doubt a mathematical truth, but this does not affect at 
all the necessary status of that truth. This means that the necessary status we 
ascribe to the proposition is dependent upon the evidence we show for believing 
that the objects the proposition describes cannot but be so,29 and not on the 
indubitability of the proposition in question. This fact will be relevant for our 
inquiry into the compatibility of transcendental arguments with fallibilism.  
The last concept that we have now to clarify is infallibility. In 
contemporary epistemology, it is easier to find analysis of the concept of 
fallibility. Accordingly, fallibility is defined in reference to one’s justification 
for believing a proposition. A fallible justification is one that is compatible with 
the falsity of the belief in question.30 In other words, my justification for 
believing P leaves open the possibility that P is false. This seems to imply that 
an infallible justification would be incompatible with the falsity of the belief in 
question. That is to say, my justification for believing Q is enough for 
establishing that Q cannot be false. I think that expressing infallibility in this 
way does not help in clarifying the concept. It would render it very similar to 
logical necessity. In fact, when we stress the necessity of a proposition on the 
basis of an a priori argument we are equally affirming that the proposition 
cannot be false (it holds in all possible worlds).  
When we say that our knowledge of a proposition is fallible, we stress 
that we have no definitive warrant that what we now believe will not come to be 
doubted or rejected in the future.31 We ascribe this fallibility also to our 
knowledge of propositions that we now believe are necessary, like those for 
example in mathematics. We do so because there are many mathematical truths 
that were considered a priori necessary, but were then discovered to be false. 
Why do we continue to claim mathematics is necessary, while denying it is 
infallible? The relevant difference lies in the fact that infallibility is something 
that is not attributed to the objects of a proposition (like necessity), but to the 
beliefs we have about those objects. Infallibility does not concern the truth of a 
proposition, but its impossibility to be believed to be false by us.32 To say that 
our knowledge of a proposition is infallible is equal to taking an outer 
perspective on the proposition itself and say that we have a definite warrant to 
assert it cannot ever be believed to be false by us.33 We use the expression ‘it 
cannot ever be believed to be false’ because infallibility is a thesis that concerns 
our actual beliefs and their permanence in the future. The impossibility referred 
to here is not psychological (since a doubt grounded only on psychological facts 
like hallucinations or dementia would not constitute a valid doubt), but neither 
strictly logical. In fact, if a proposition came to be generally recognized as false 
on the basis of a logically invalid argument, but that argument were considered 
sufficient to prove its falsity, this would be enough for claiming that our 
knowledge of that proposition is fallible. Infallibility is thus an epistemic claim 
stressing that a proposition cannot ever be recognized as false by rational 
inquirers. 
On the contrary, when we say that a mathematical proposition is 
necessary, we are providing evidence that the objects it describes cannot but be 
so. We are thus developing our knowledge of mathematical objects. If the 
evidence we were required to provide were equivalent to warranting that our 
proposition could not ever be believed to be false, we would not be able to claim 
necessity for any mathematical proposition.  
This point is quite significant, since it implies that our knowledge of a 
proposition, in order to be infallible, must show that this proposition cannot be 
doubted. If the proposition could be doubted, we could not provide a definite 
warrant that it could not ever be believed to be false. This is not so in the case of 
necessity. We saw that it is perfectly possible that a necessary proposition is 
believed to be false. So, a necessary proposition is not in principle indubitable. 
On the other hand, a proposition infallibly known, insofar as we need to provide 
a definite warrant that it cannot ever be believed to be false, has to be in 
principle indubitable. 
The result of these reflections on the concept of infallibility is a pragmatic 
conditional of this kind: if a proposition were truly infallibly known, it could not 
ever be doubted (or it could not ever be believed to be false).34 This seems to 
imply the following conditional for fallibility: if a proposition were truly fallibly 
known, it could be doubted (or it could be believed to be false). 
Recall the pragmatic conditional linked to the concept of necessity (if a 
proposition were truly necessary, we could not find any instance that falsifies it). 
It is easy to show how these conditionals have different practical implications. 
The necessity of a proposition can be doubted, and then re-established thanks to 
further investigation. This is possible because our doubt is a subjective 
standpoint on the objects our proposition describes. When we have good reasons 
to give up doubting, the fact that we did doubt the proposition does not affect the 
possibility of ascribing necessity again, since necessity is something we ascribe 
to objects and not to our beliefs. On the contrary, infallibility is something that 
we ascribe to our believing something, asserting that there is a definite warrant 
that a proposition cannot ever be believed to be false. Thus, if we came to doubt 
a supposedly indubitable proposition, and then had good reasons to give up 
doubting, we could not re-establish the claim of infallibility for our belief in that 
proposition, since that proposition could not be held to be indubitable any more. 
To sum up, infallibility is a much stronger claim with respect to necessity. 
It stresses that a proposition is in principle indubitable (it cannot ever be 
believed to be false), while necessity allows the possibility of doubt. 
We could claim that a proposition is necessary while denying that our 
knowledge of it is infallible.35 This seems to follow from the fact that a 
necessary proposition is not in principle indubitable, while a proposition 
infallibly known is so. Of course, the fact that a proposition is doubted can 
possibly result in its refutation, and this obviously would prove false the 
previous contention of necessity (the possibility of re-establishment for the 
necessary status of that proposition would still be open, though). However, if we 
have good reasons to believe in the necessary status of a proposition and no 
reason to believe in its contingency,36 we are allowed to stress it is necessary, 
even if it is impossible for us to know if future research will prove our 
contention to be false. This is possible because by claiming necessity we are not 
asserting that the proposition is in principle indubitable. On the contrary, we are 
expressing our thesis on the status of the objects the proposition refers to and we 
are claiming we have good reasons to believe our thesis is right and no reason to 
believe it is false. The fact that the propositions we claim to be necessary are not 
in principle indubitable (and thus infallibly known) means that we could also be 
wrong on their necessity. But, as far as the contention of necessity is an attempt 
to grasp their objective status, we are allowed to claim necessity, as long as we 
provide sufficient evidence to do so. We can say that water is necessarily H2O, 
even if we cannot assure that this proposition will not be refuted by future 
research. Again, this proposition expresses a well confirmed thesis on the status 
of the objects it refers to, but it cannot be held to be infallibly known. 
The case of infallibility is really different. Infallibility does not express 
our attempt to know some objects, but is a claim that concerns our beliefs on 
those objects. In order to maintain that our knowledge of a proposition is 
infallible it is thus insufficient to have good reasons to do so. One should give 
proofs that no rational inquirer could actually come to doubt the proposition in 
question. 
The pragmatic clarifications we have here provided helped us in 
clarifying the use we make of the concepts of a priority, necessity and 
infallibility. Especially concerning the latter two, we have been able to identify 
the practical consequences that would follow concerning dubitability and 
indubitability. This opens a path to reflect upon the main problem of this study, 
that is: is it possible for a proponent of transcendental argument to endorse 
fallibilism? Would the a priori necessity he/she claims for his/her argument be in 
conflict with this endorsement? We should attempt to answer these questions in 
the next section. 
 
5. Transcendental Philosophy and Falibilism 
 
Following our analyses of the concepts of necessity and infallibility, it is 
possible to claim necessity for a proposition while not claiming that our belief in 
it is infallible, since the latter contention would entail a really stronger position. 
By stressing infallibility, we would be claiming that the proposition in question 
could not ever be doubted. On the contrary, by stressing necessity, we would be 
maintaining that the objects we are considering in our proposition cannot but be 
as they are.37 We would not be saying that the proposition in question is in 
principle indubitable. In fact, necessary propositions can also be believed to be 
false, even if they are not. Of course, we might be wrong in stressing necessity, 
and the proposition we claimed to be necessary could be actually false, or only 
contingent. However, if we have good reason to believe we are right and no 
reason to believe we are not, we can assert our proposition is necessary, as long 
as this is the only way to carry on research. 
We have now to consider if these conclusions can be also attributed to the 
contention of necessity claimed by transcendental arguments. The first thing to 
notice is that transcendental arguments aim to establish necessity by means of an 
a priori line of reasoning. This does not seem to be a problem, since, as we have 
stressed in the previous section, a priority is an epistemic concept that concerns 
the way in which we get to know something. It does not make any difference for 
the necessity we claim for a proposition if it is known a priori or not. Necessity 
is a claim concerning the status of the objects considered. If we consider the a 
priori reasoning of mathematics for example, necessity is something we ascribe 
to mathematical objects. 
Keeping this point in mind, let us come back to our analysis of 
transcendental arguments. In the second section of this paper, we recognized 
two kinds of transcendental arguments that we called respectively anti-sceptical 
and Kantian transcendental arguments. We need now establish if what we 
stressed about necessity and fallibilism in general also applies to them. 
I will take into consideration Kantian transcendental arguments first. I 
argued that Kantian transcendental arguments assume that there are necessary 
and a priori elements in our knowledge. Then, they establish which subjective 
conditions are necessary to account for the presence of those elements.38 They 
do so by demonstrating that there could not be such elements in our knowledge 
if there were not these conditions. I stressed that, in pursuing this examination of 
our knowledge and its conditions, transcendental arguments take an objective 
standpoint on the issue, even if they seek to identify subjective conditions. 
Kantian transcendental arguments do not analytically derive their conclusions 
from the fact that we cannot deny we are reflective subjects (this seems to be the 
point of view of anti-sceptical transcendental arguments). On the contrary, they 
consider some objects of knowledge and trace back their origins to the 
subjective point of view we have on those objects. Thus, they seek to establish 
an objective relationship between those objects and their conditions. 
As far as Kantian transcendental arguments share the same objective 
standpoint that we have attributed to claims of necessity in general,39 they allow 
the possibility of doubt as well. If we had good reason to doubt that character A 
of our knowledge depended necessarily on subjective condition X, but then we 
found better reasons to discard that doubt, there would be no reason to avoid the 
re-establishment of the claim of necessity for condition X. Therefore, as far as 
we stressed that fallibilism claims that a proposition is not in principle 
indubitable, successful Kantian transcendental arguments can be considered 
necessary even though their conclusions are held to be fallibly known. They can 
be considered necessary inasmuch as they show sufficient evidence for believing 
in a necessary relation among their objects of interest,40 but their conclusions 
can be held to be fallibly known, insofar as they can in principle be doubted. 
Let us now turn to the other kind of transcendental arguments. Following 
our reconstruction of their way of arguing, anti-sceptical transcendental 
arguments argue that we cannot coherently believe some propositions to be 
false. They do so by showing that propositions concerning objects of knowledge 
are logically entailed in an indubitable proposition concerning our reflective 
standpoint. If this is true, it means that anti-sceptical transcendental arguments 
argue for the necessity of their conclusions by stressing that they are known 
infallibly, since, according to our pragmatic clarification of the concept of 
infallibility, saying that our knowledge of a proposition is infallible is equivalent 
to saying that it cannot ever be doubted. Thus, it would be contradictory to say 
that an anti-sceptical transcendental argument is necessary even though its 
conclusions are known only fallibly, since it seeks to establish necessity on the 
basis of our impossibility to believe something to be false, i.e. on infallibility. 
To be fair, in the case of infallibility the impossibility of doubting a 
proposition is not psychological, but neither strictly logical. As we have asserted 
above, the impossibility referred to is a claim stressing that a proposition cannot 
ever be recognized as false by rational inquirers. On the contrary, in the case of 
anti-sceptical transcendental arguments the impossibility of doubting a 
proposition is logical. Sceptics would be in contradiction if they doubted the 
proposition in question. However, sceptics normally address questions that 
nobody would actually believe to be false. Thus, by providing a logical 
refutation of the possibility of posing a sceptical doubt, anti-sceptical 
transcendental arguments seek to establish that neither the sceptic could 
coherently believe the proposition in question to be false. This logical procedure 
is thus used to prove that the proposition in question is a proposition that could 
not ever be recognized as false by rational inquirers. Accordingly, anti-sceptical 
transcendental arguments seek to establish the necessity of their conclusions by 
claiming infallibility. So, they cannot be fallibilist about their arguments. 
It could be argued that proponents of anti-sceptical transcendental 
arguments can consider their claims to be fallible on the meta-level, that is by 
analyzing their arguments in a reflective way. I do not think that this is a 
possible solution though. It would be quite odd to claim that the necessity of a 
proposition is proved by showing that our belief in it is infallible and than 
sustain that this proof itself is fallible on the meta-level. This consideration 
parallels a reflexive question that could be posed to fallibilist transcendental 
philosophers concerning the possibility to be fallibilist about that fallibilism 
itself. I do not think that this kind of reflexive questions can help us in resolving 
the problem. This is not to say that reflexive questions are always question 
begging. I just want to suggest that in this case they do not offer an alternative 




The aim of this paper was to establish if proponents of transcendental arguments 
can coherently hold the conclusions of their arguments to be fallibly known. In 
order to answer this question, we have proposed a pragmatic clarification of the 
concepts of a priority, necessity and infallibility. In view of those clarifications, 
we were able to stress that a proposition could be claimed to be a priori 
knowable, necessary and fallibly known, insofar as a priority concerns only the 
way in which we get to know that proposition, and necessity concerns the status 
of the objects that such proposition aims to describe. On the contrary, 
infallibility claims that a proposition could not ever be doubted. A necessary 
proposition could in principle be doubted (and then be re-established), while an 
infallibly known proposition would be in principle indubitable.  
We applied these reflections to the descriptions of transcendental 
arguments we provided at the beginning of the paper. In that context, we 
recognized two kinds of transcendental arguments that we called anti-sceptical 
and Kantian. We argued that Kantian transcendental arguments can coherently 
be held to be necessary while stressing that our believing in their conclusions is 
fallible, since by claiming necessity they express their position on the status of 
the objects they refer to. In stressing necessity in this way, they do not need to 
be in principle indubitable, and infallibility is precisely a claim of indubitability. 
This was not so for anti-sceptical transcendental arguments, which seek to 
establish necessity for some propositions doubted by the sceptic by showing that 
they are in principle indubitable. As far as infallibility is a claim of indubitability 
and anti-sceptical transcendental arguments seek to establish necessity through 
indubitability, they cannot coherently be held to be necessary while stressing 
that our believing in their conclusions is fallible. 
Coming back to our original problem, it follows from what we stressed 
that only proponents of Kantian transcendental arguments can coherently hold 
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1. Of course, one can propose transcendental arguments aiming at establishing 
conditions of possibility concerning other issues, say for example meaning, or reference. 
That said, we should keep in mind that the most part of transcendental arguments address 
conditions of possibility for knowledge and experience. 
2. “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object.” (Peirce, W 3:266). 
3. Moreover, an emphasis on the practical consequences of a concept will be able 
to show what a critic should do in order to challenge the claim of a priority, necessity, 
and fallibility. If he/she would be able to show that some of these practical consequences 
do not hold, then the claim would be refuted. 
4. Strawson 1959, 1966. See Gava (forthcoming) for a more detailed analysis of 
Strawson’s interpretation of Kant. 
5. See Stern 1999. 
6. Accordingly, Barry Stroud (1994) argues that anti-sceptical transcendental 
arguments cannot make the step from beliefs to reality, insofar as they concern relations 
internal to our system of beliefs, and not the link between beliefs and reality. 
7. See Allison 1983; Bird 2006; Carl 1992. 
8. In this respect, Kant’s project is similar to the ‘therapeutic’ philosophy of 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein, during his entire philosophical career, conceived philosophy 
as a therapeutic undertaking. This means that for him philosophy had not to propose a 
theory, but had to eliminate false beliefs generated by unclarities in our language. 
Similarly, Kant wanted to resolve inescapable controversies about metaphysics by means 
of an analysis of how we form those ideas, not by proposing his own theory on those 
objects.  
9. In fact, Kant considered “how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” 
(KrV, B 19) the main question his first Critique had to answer. The question was not: are 
synthetic a priori judgments possible? See Collins 1999, 91–100. 
10. See Carl 2006, 187; Collins 1999, 93. I defend this interpretation of Kant 
more fully in Gava (forthcoming). 
11. “First, then, if a proposition is thought along with its necessity, it is an a 
priori judgment; if it is, moreover, also not derived from any proposition except one that 
in turn is valid as a necessary proposition, then it is absolutely a priori. Second: 
Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative 
universality (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have yet 
perceived, there is no exception to this or that rule. Thus if a judgment is thought in strict 
universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, then it is 
not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely a priori. … Necessity and 
strict universality are therefore secure indications of an a priori cognition” (KrV, B 3–4).  
12. This would not probably be confirmed by contemporary philosophers. Saul 
Kripke (1980) argues that we can have contingent a priori knowable, just as necessary a 
posteriori knowable, propositions. 
13. “As far as certainty is concerned, I have myself pronounced the judgment that 
in this kind of inquiry it is in no way allowed to hold opinions, and that anything that 
even looks like a hypothesis is a forbidden commodity, which should not be put up for 
sale even at the lowest price but must be confiscated as soon as it is discovered. For every 
cognition that is supposed to be certain a priori proclaims that it wants to be held for 
absolutely necessary, and even more is this true of a determination of all pure cognitions 
a priori, which is to be the standard and thus even the example of all apodictic 
(philosophical) certainty” (KrV, A xv). 
14. See Westphal (2004) for a an account of Kant’s philosophy compatible with 
fallibilism. 
15. Joseph Margolis (1998, 2007) has argued that fallibilism is the linchpin for 
understanding Peirce’s philosophy as a whole. 
16. “Mathematical reasoning holds. Why should it not? It relates only to the 
creations of the mind, concerning which there is no obstacle to our learning whatever is 
true of them. The method of this book, therefore, is to accept the reasonings of pure 
mathematics as beyond all doubt. It is fallible, as everything human is fallible. Twice two 
may perhaps not be four. ... As a fact, I have not the slightest doubt that twice two is four; 
nor have you. Then let us not pretend to doubt mathematical demonstrations of 
mathematical propositions so long as they are not open to mathematical criticism and 
have been submitted to sufficient examination and revision” (CP 2.192). 
17. Christopher Hookway (2004) showed that Peircean pragmatic clarifications 
are much more complex than this. However, for our purposes it will be sufficient to limit 
ourselves to this formulation. 
18. Peirce, W 3:266. 
 19. One of Peirce’s preferred examples is the proposition asserting that the sum 
of the angles of a triangle is 180°. This proposition does not hold in non-Euclidean 
geometries. In his book In Defence of Pure Reason, Laurence Bonjour (1998, 110–5) 
argues that there can be false, and thus fallible, a priori justification. 
20. This entails that a critic, in order to discard the attribution of a priority, needs 
only to show that some inductive considerations did take place in the process of obtaining 
the proposition in question.  
21. See Lewis 1956, chaps. 7–8. 
22. In this paper I will ignore the problem whether a priori knowledge, especially 
in mathematics, is analytic or synthetic.  
23. Kripke 1980, 35–9. 
24. The synthetic truths here referred to are of course a posteriori truths. I do not 
want to raise here the problem about the existence of synthetic a priori truths, which 
would deviate the attention from the chief argument of this paper. Here, I just would like 
to point out that synthetic a priori truths cannot be considered metaphysically necessary 
in the sense here presented, since they limit their validity to a world known through 
human cognitive capacities. 
25. Of course, in the case of physical and transcendental necessities this 
pragmatic clarification only holds if the proposition in question is expressed in a 
conditional sentence that holds in all possible worlds. Thus, in the case of physical 
necessity for example, the pragmatic clarification should have this form: if the 
proposition asserting “necessarily, if a possible world had the same physical 
characteristics as ours then physical law L would apply to it” were truly necessary, then 
we could not find any instance that falsifies it. 
26. This entails that a critic, in order to discard the attribution of necessity, needs 
to give good reasons to believe that there are possible instances that falsify the 
proposition in question. Of course, if these reasons were rejected there would be no 
problem for the contention of necessity. 
27. See Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975. 
28. Christopher Hookway correctly suggested to me that mathematics is fallible 
as far as it is subject to errors, while observational sciences are both subject to errors and 
to new experimental evidence. It is true that experimental evidence can manifest 
mathematical mistakes. However, those mistakes have to be accounted for without 
reference to the particular evidence that renders them clear. Consequently, the origin of 
their error must be placed more in the a priori argument, than in the experimental 
evidence. 
29. To be precise, in the case of physical and transcendental necessity we should 
give evidence that the objects the proposition describes cannot but be so in a physical 
world like ours, or in a world known through cognitive capacities like ours.  
30. Leite 2010. 
31. This seems to be more in line with Peirce’s concept of fallibilism. Christopher 
Hookway (2007, 20) gives a similar description of this doctrine. 
32. Accordingly, Susan Haack (1979) stresses that fallibility and infallibility are 
not characters that are directly imputable to a proposition, but just to our believing it. 
33. In this respect, Lisa Warenski (2009, 417–8) stresses that fallibilism is a 
second order claim on our knowledge. 
34. This entails that a critic, in order to discard the attribution of infallibility, 
needs only to show that a genuine doubt on the proposition is, or has been, possible.  
35. Christopher Hookway (2007) considered a different, but related, problem with 
respect to fallibilism. He argued against Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson that truth 
can be an aim of inquiry even if we endorse fallibilism. 
36. When I speak of ‘good reasons to believe’ or ‘evidence’, I am aware of using 
vague formulations. This follows from the fact that we can claim necessity both in a 
priori and a posteriori inquiry and the burden of proof is really different in these domains. 
My point is that also in case of a priori reasoning, an argument, in order to be considered 
valid, does not need to stress that it is impossible that anybody will come to coherently 
doubt the argument in question. 
37. Again, in the case of physical and transcendental necessity, the contention that 
the objects cannot but be so must be limited to the relevant domains. 
38. As I have already stressed, the necessity of Kantian transcendental arguments 
holds only in a world subject to human cognitive capacities. Thus, in order to apply our 
pragmatic clarification of necessity to them, we must use a conditional similar to that we 
used for physical laws: Necessarily, if a possible world were subject to the human 
cognitive constitution, it would be subject to subjective conditions X, Y, Z, etc. Graham 
Bird (2006, 77–82) stresses that, following Kripke’s schema, Kant’s transcendental 
judgments should be considered contingent a priori truths. 
39. Thus, Kantian transcendental arguments identify epistemic conditions (they 
are conditions dependent on our subjective standpoint) with objective implications (they 
are in a necessary relation with the objects of our knowledge). 
40. Of course, as we asserted above, we might be wrong in claiming necessity, 
but as long as we have evidence to believe our thesis to be right and no reason to believe 
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